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haps then commentators will actually theorize about theAbstract: 
harms, or lack thereof, of particular NRTs and NGTs.
ommentators argue that statutory prohibitions withC the force of the criminal law should not be used to
regulate new reproductive technologies (NRTs) and
novel genetic technologies (NGTs). Bill C-13, the Introducing the Arguments 
Assisted Human Reproduction Act, however, codifies 10
ommentators argue that NRTs and NGTs shouldcriminal bans. This paper considers the merits of the C not be regulated, even if only in part, by way ofvarious arguments levied against Bill C-13, and the corol-
statutory prohibitions with the force of the criminal law.lary claim that only a ‘‘non-prohibitive’’ model of legisla-
In essence, they claim legislation without criminal banstion befits NRTs and NGTs.
is better. The Canadian Parliament, however, may not be
Three types of arguments are used to critique crim- persuaded. Bill C-13, the Assisted Human Reproduction
inal bans: Act, which includes several criminal bans, has already
passed second reading. 1 In this paper, I consider the(1) ‘‘Structural’’ arguments hinge on the con-
merits (and demerits) of all the arguments that havestraints of the Canadian legal system — legisla-
been levied in protest of Bill C-13’s current form, and thetion complete with prohibitions runs afoul of
corollary claim that, taken together, these argumentsthe Constitution Act 1867, violates the Cana-
favour a ‘‘non-prohibitive’’ or ‘‘regulatory’’ model of legis-dian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and
lation for NRTs and NGTs.cannot keep pace with scientific progress.
It is not my aim to review the extensive legislative
(2) ‘‘Consequentialist’’ arguments focus on the history of Bill C-13, and the variety of initiatives that
potential results of enacting a statute carrying preceded the Bill, though the specifics of those initiatives
criminal bans — criminalization will chill do factor into the analysis, adding context to the argu-
research, drive research underground, encourage ments that are identified. In fact, the literature from
researcher forum shopping, fuel public mis- which the arguments are abstracted largely predates
perception by reinforcing genetic determinism, Bill C-13, and grew in response to past initiatives. Articles
and effectively foreclose important dialogue on attacking the provisions of Bill C-13 essentially recycle
NRTs and NGTs. many of the same arguments, supporting the contention
that attempts to utilise the criminal law power have
(3) ‘‘Theoretical’’ arguments relate to the very stymied legislative action up to this point. This paper
nature of criminal law — prohibitions will be aims to decipher whether that should be the case; insofar
unenforceable; the criminal law, a model of as the identified arguments can be substantially under-
‘‘command and control’’, will be ineffective in mined, the debate needs to take a new direction.
shaping research practice; and moral ambiguity
Bill C-13 combines a regulatory scheme with statu-can support only regulation, as consensus is a
tory prohibitions. 2 The controversy centres on the 10sine qua none for criminal bans.
prohibited activities, however, listed in section 5 of the
All the arguments in opposition to criminal bans Bill. 3 Only these statutory prohibitions, which attach
prove unpersuasive; moreover, they fail to substantiate a maximum penalties of a $500,000 fine and/or 10 years’
non-prohibitive alternative for NRT–NGT regulation. imprisonment, 4 have attracted explicit criticism as
Bill C-13 should therefore be proclaimed into law; per- ‘‘blunt instruments’’ of the criminal law. Yet Bill C-13
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provides that all other contraventions of the Bill itself, or The paper takes on all these arguments in that
regulations made under it, or the terms and conditions order. Compartmentalizing arguments in this fashion
of a licence, are punishable by a maximum fine of reveals significant crossover of premises and claims. The
$250,000 and/or imprisonment for up to five years. 5 Any structural argument that criminal bans are inflexible
breach of section 5 can attract prosecution as an indict- appears to underpin several other claims, including, for
able offence or as a summary conviction offence; the example, that prohibitive legislation will not be effective
same applies for a breach of any of the other provisions, in the NRT–NGT context. Compartmentalization is
regulations, or licence terms. Commentators have not thus analytically profitable; if a claim is demonstrably
always been careful to articulate whether their criticism suspect, the force of a ‘‘new’’ claim, which relies on the
of Bill C-13’s use of the criminal law extends beyond suspect claim, is weakened — reassertion is not persua-
section 5. This suggests that commentators are less con- sive argument.
cerned about the use of the criminal law in principle,
One claim, however, transcends nearly all the argu-and more about what precisely is the subject of prohibi-
ments made against the use of prohibitions: legislation,tion.
which codifies a purely regulatory approach, is better
Therein lies the superficiality of the present debate. suited for NRTs and NGTs. The arguments against crim-
Critics are, for the most part, squabbling over the alleged inal bans are, in opponents’ minds, markedly less prob-
features of the criminal law, as opposed to proffering lematic when applied to a non-prohibitive scheme. To
why (or why not) they view a particular activity as appro- assess this corollary claim, it is essential to envisage an
priate for prohibition (or not). In keeping with the litera- alternate form of Bill C-13 throughout this paper.
ture, I will restrict my focus to section 56 and the appro- Timothy Caulfield sketches the following:
priateness of criminalizing those activities in an effort to
There is an alternate, non-prohibition model that wouldmove the debate past this level of superficiality. To avoid
allow the federal government to achieve its stated policya taxonomy dispute, only the offences created by sec- goals and produce a more flexible and effective regulatory
tion 5 of Bill C-13 will be regarded as ‘‘true crimes’’. 7 environment.
Furthermore, I do not question whether legislation The federal government could create a regulatory body
empowered to both issue licences for a defined set of activi-(of any kind) is needed. 8 Existing mechanisms such as
ties . . . and produce, modify, and monitor a ‘‘moratoriumself-regulation and established civil and criminal laws
list.’’ This list would contain the activities which, at thisare, in my view, not adequate responses to NRTs and time, should not be allowed (e.g., reproductive cloning). One
NGTs. 9 I will also assume that the statutory prohibitions of the primary advantages of such an approach is that the
are drafted with precision sufficient to satisfy the ‘‘prin- list could be amended and interpreted by the regulatory
body instead of by Parliament. In addition, the law could setciple of legality’’ — the requirement that the law be
out a specific consultation process, thereby facilitating andknowable in advance. 10
promoting an ongoing, interdisciplinary dialogue on these
important issues. By doing so, the regulatory body couldThe paper is divided according to argument type. In respond to the issues associated with reproductive genetics
my estimation, there are three different types of argu- in a more precise and flexible manner. 13
ments used to critique criminal bans: ‘‘structural’’ argu-
ments, ‘‘consequentialist’’ arguments, and ‘‘theoretical’’ Caulfield and other spokespersons for the non-pro-
arguments. Structural arguments hinge on the con- hibitive alternative are looking primarily at the frame-
straints of the Canadian legal system bearing upon work in place in the United Kingdom. The Human
Bill C-13 — legislation complete with prohibitions Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (the HFEA), cre-
potentially runs afoul of the division of powers set out by ated pursuant to the Human Fertilisation and Embry-
the Constitution Act, 1867 11 and/or violates the Cana- ology Act (the HFE Act) has regulated NRTs for over a
dian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,12 and legislation decade and NGTs more recently. 14 This experience
cannot keep pace with scientific progress (it is too diffi- presents a wealth of information, which Canadian legis-
cult to amend). Consequentialist arguments high- lators should carefully scrutinize. The operation of the
light the potential effects of enactinga statute that carries HFEA and the UK legislation is analysed in the context
the force of criminal law — criminalization will chill of several of the arguments below.15 However, it is worth
research, and/or drive the research underground beyond noting at the outset that this legislation contains general
regulation, and/or encourage forum shopping, and/or prohibitions under threat of criminal sanction. 16
fuel public misperception by reinforcing genetic deter-
minism, and/or put an end to dialogue. Theoretical Indeed, Bill C-13 and the HFE Act illustrate the
arguments relate to the very nature of criminal law — defects of a prohibitive/non-prohibitive dichotomy.
these prohibitions will be unenforceable; the criminal Various classifications can be devised for the range of
law, a model of ‘‘command and control’’, will be ineffec- legislative approaches. 17 After due consideration of all the
tive in shaping research practice; and moral ambiguity arguments canvassed in the course of this paper though,
can support only regulation, as consensus is a sine qua a fair assessment of the two competing legislative models






























































(e) persons who seek to undergo assisted reproductionStructural Arguments procedures must not be discriminated against,
including on the basis of their sexual orientation ortructural arguments question whether the federal
marital status;S government can, in the legal abstract, legislate in
(f) trade in the reproductive capacities of women andrespect of NRTs and NGTs. Merely invoking the spectre
men and the exploitation of children, women andof constitutional challenge is a specious argument. If that men for commercial ends raise health and ethical
were sufficient, Parliament might never enact laws. Still, concerns that justify their prohibition; and
because structural arguments have been made on (g) human individuality and diversity, and the integrity
repeated occasion, in the Canadian context and of the human genome, must be preserved and pro-
tected.abroad, 18 they merit more generous analysis. The argu-
ments in this part, however, depend uniquely on the This declaration strives to strike a balance: a balance
Canadian Constitution and law-making processes in Par- between the potential benefits that NRTs and NGTs are
liament generally. thought to hold, and the harms that those technologies
potentially bring to bear. 20 That the legislation may not
The Division of Powers be the most effective means of securing this balance or
that the harmfulness of the activities that it prohibits isThe division of powers argument, broadly speaking,
subject to question does not detract from its pith andis that Bill C-13 is inconsistent with the federal govern-
substance. 21 Bill C-13, unequivocally, is directed at safe-ment’s sources of jurisdiction as entrenched in the Con-
guarding the public interest in NRTs and NGTs. Thestitution Act, 1867.
Bill recognizes that these technologies may deliver tre-As a federal state, Canada divides powers or respon-
mendous health benefits to Canadians while acknowl-sibilities between the federal government and the pro-
edging that they bring into play fundamental issues ofvincial governments. The heads of power for each level
morality affecting women and children in particular, butof government are listed in sections 91 and 92 of the
also humanity as a whole.Constitution Act, 1867, respectively. Legislation outside
the authority of the enacting government (contrary to
the division of powers) is ultra vires and therefore of no The Legislation is Ultra Vires Parliament 
force and effect. The division of powers test involves two NRTs and NGTs are nonetheless nebulous subjectsteps: first, the primary aim of the legislation — its ‘‘pith matter. The issue, then, is whether they are amenable toand substance’’ as distinguished from its ‘‘merely inci- any of the listed sources of federal jurisdiction. In thedental effects’’ — is deciphered; second, whether the pith past, the Royal Commission on New Reproductiveand substance of the legislation falls within the powers of Technologies claimed that legislation would bethe government seeking to enact is determined. 19 To grounded in several heads of power, including peace,effectively engage with the arguments against federal leg- order, and good government (POGG), the criminal law,islation affecting NRTs and NGTs, which turn on the trade and commerce, and the spending power. 22second step of the division of powers test, it is necessary
Martha Jackman posits instead that legislation liketo characterize the pith and substance of Bill C-13.
Bill C-13 may be unconstitutional because it is akin to
public health legislation, 23 and ‘‘health’’ is subject matterBill C-13 in Pith and Substance 
that has traditionally been assigned to the provinces. 24The text itself is the logical starting point. Section 2 However, a comment by Jennifer Llewellyn, Jocelynof Bill C-13, a statutory declaration, reads as follows: Downie, and Robert Holmes, in relation to research
(2) The Parliament of Canada recognizes and declares that involving humans (RIH), which applies equally to NRTs
(a) the health and well-being of children born through and NGTs, is apposite in effectively answering this objec-
the application of assited human reproductive tech- tion:nologies must be given priority in all decisions
It is important to recognize . . . the opening words of s. 92respecting their use;
‘‘[i]n each province’’ as a limitation to the scope of provincial(b) the benefits of assisted human reproductive tech-
jurisdiction . . . The limit is intended not only to protectnologies and related research for individuals, fami-
against provincial intrusion into the federal sphere oflies and for society in general can be most effec-
authority, but also to ensure one province cannot trench ontively secured by taking appropriate measures for
the powers of another province . . . This may pose significantthe protection and promotion of human health,
difficulties in the context of RIH given the extent to whichsafety, dignity and rights in the use of these technol-
research projects are integrated and carried out simultane-ogies and in related research;
ously in different locations in different provinces. It is gener-
(c) while all persons are affected by these technologies, ally necessary for research protocols to be consistent in all
women more than men are directly and signifi- locations and thus the regulations of one province are
cantly affected by their application and the health bound to have effects on the conduct of researchers engaged
and well-being of women must be protected in the in the same project in other provinces. Further, even in cases
application of these technologies; where the research is located within the boundaries of a
(d) the principle of free and informed consent must be single province, the results and effects of the research are
promoted and applied as a fundamental condition not. The products of such research will reach those beyond
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Laws targeting public health issues have, moreover, Banning Cloning Violates Freedom of Expression 
been upheld as valid exercises of federal jurisdiction, 26 Barbara Billingsley argues that the prohibition on
but not on the basis of the POGG power. 27 Rather, such cloning, which encompasses both so-called ‘‘reproduc-
legislation is constitutionally sound if tied to the crim- tive’’ and ‘‘therapeutic’’ cloning, 37 potentially violates the
inal law power. The federal government has made this freedom of expression guarantee. 38 She concludes that,
link express, stating in May 2001 that, ‘‘[t]he draft legisla- ‘‘the question of whether the [cloning ban] unjustifiably
tion is founded upon federal responsibility for criminal violates s. 2(b) of the Charter is a very good question
law, as is other health protection legislation such as the indeed’’ because the answer is ‘‘complex and not easily
Food and Drugs Act and the Tobacco Act.’’ 28 That the determined’’. 39 For the following reasons, I disagree.
Bill is decidedly about morality, a purpose central to
To qualify as expression for the purposes of para-criminal law,29 is plain from the statutory declaration
graph 2(b), the alleged expression has to conveyand also the very nature of NRTs and NGTs:
meaning. 40 Billingsley anticipates the argument that ‘‘theIn much the same way as the courts have found that only
physical procedure itself does not communicate a mes-Parliament has the jurisdiction to criminalize (or conversely,
decriminalize) abortion, similar authority would exist it sage’’, and the related claim that the ban does not pro-
seems for the criminalization of such controversial practices hibit research writ large, but rather ‘‘only one element of
as cloning, the creation of human/animal hybrids, use of research’’. 41 In response, she offers a different view offetal tissue and stem cells, etc. 30 [footnote omitted]
research: therapeutic cloning, or the conduct of an exper-
Thus Parliament can enact Bill C-13 as it presently iment involving therapeutic cloning, conveys meaning
stands pursuant to subsection 91(27) of the Constitution inasmuch as it is viewed as part of a scientific process,
Act, 1867, jurisdiction over the criminal law.31 emanating from a scientific hypothesis, in which the act
of choosing to do one experiment over others is reflec-
Parliament Cannot Enact a Regulatory Regime tive (or communicative) of that hypothesis. This process
— generation of a hypothesis followed by experimenta-Jackman, as well as Allison Harvison Young and
tion to test that hypothesis — she argues, conveysAngela Wasunna, alternatively suggest that predomi-
meaning ‘‘regardless of whether the experiment’s resultsnantly regulatory legislation escapes federal authority. 32
are recorded or disseminated’’. 42While Bill C-13 is referred to as prohibitive throughout
this paper, it potentially fits this description. 33 Neverthe- The difficulty with her reasoning is that it assumes
less, as Llewellyn, Downie, and Holmes persuasively that the hypothesis underlying an experiment is discern-
explain, recent Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence able from the choice of experiment. But the exact experi-
gives ample scope to use the criminal law power to ment could be performed to test the hypothesis ‘‘X’’ (e.g.,
deploy a complex regulatory scheme.34 cell growth) and ‘‘not X’’ (e.g., no cell growth). If cell
growth results, the experiment provides support for theThere are some limits on this deference, however,
hypothesis ‘‘X’’. If cell growth does not result, the experi-and one in particular is germane in view of the non-
ment provides support for the hypothesis ‘‘not X’’.prohibitive alternative described above. Caulfield advo-
Because the hypothesis cannot be deciphered when onlycates for a ‘‘moratorium list’’ of proscribed activities, as
the experimental procedure is known, the meaning ofopposed to full-fledged criminal bans, which could be
the experiment is lost. In terms of paragraph 2(b) of themodified by a regulatory body. In a recent decision, the
Charter, the conduct of an experiment by itself is notSupreme Court held that a regulatory body that has the
communicative when, by definition, the experiment’sauthority to ‘‘define offences’’ is outside the proper exer-
hypothesis could either be ‘‘X’’ or ‘‘not X’’.cise of the criminal law power. 35 This significantly
undermines the claim that a non-prohibitive approach is Billingsley does, to a limited extent, recognize that
optimal, from a division of powers perspective. the meaning of an experiment may be plural:
a scientist [who] decides to test his or her hypothesis aboutThe Charter cell growth by using only certain types of cells . . . may be
conveying the message that the hypothesis is applicable onlyThe other line of attack under the Constitution
to certain cells, that the use of other cells is unethical orrelies on the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms immoral, or that the hypothesis is most easily demonstrated
(the Charter). If any of the statutory prohibitions in the by the selected cell group. 43
Bill are found to contradict the rights and freedoms
However, these various possible implications allproscribed by the Charter, then that prohibition may be
follow from a prior understanding of the cell growthdeclared of no force or effect. In theory, the proposed Act
hypothesis, which is not self-evident from the experi-in its entirety could be struck down.36 If, however, there
mental procedure. Thus the objection Billingsley antici-is only a chance of conflict with constitutionalized rights
pates — the conduct of the experiment itself is non-com-and freedoms, legislation respecting NRTs and NGTs
municative — is not answered.should not be forestalled. Ban opponents advance two
possible Charter infringements: infringement of freedom Alternatively, Billingsley suggests that even if the
of expression and infringement of the right to liberty, conduct of this research lacks meaning, it is logically






























































of that research. 44 However, it is logically possible to Law-Making Processes 
conduct the experiment without recording or dissemi-
nating any results. Of course a scientist could attempt to Commentators have questioned the appropriateness
clone a human being without writing anything down. of statutory prohibitions because legislation, allegedly,
Thus, while the recording and dissemination may be takes too long to enact or amend, whereas regulations
expression, the cloning itself is not. can be issued more rapidly. This poor timeliness is seen
as particularly problematic in the area of NRTs andBillingsley’s arguments in support of the claim that NGTs because it is ‘‘characterised by rapid scientific andthe act of experimentation itself qualifies as expression clinical developments’’. 53 I will consider these twoprotected by paragraph 2(b) are unconvincing; as such related criticisms claims in succession.her section 1 Charter analysis does not merit further
discussion.
Legislation is More Difficult To Amend or Enact
Banning Cloning Violates Liberty of the Person Than Regulations 
Another possible argument against Bill C-13 is that
It has already been pointed out that legislation canprohibiting reproductive cloning violates the right to lib-
in theory be enacted in as few as 24 days in Canada, 54erty of the person because it is a denial of ‘‘procreative
while Bill C-13 establishes a regulation-enacting proce-liberty’’. To date this argument has not surfaced in the
dure that can require 60 days. 55 Caulfield, one of theCanadian debate. 45 Notable American commentators,
primary advocates of the timeliness claim, concedes theincluding John Robertson and Ronald Dworkin, have
fact but cautions that swift Parliamentary action is excep-put forth this claim in relation to the American Constitu-
tional, maintaining that, ‘‘the pace at which Parliamenttion, however, so it is worthy of brief consideration in
typically moves to enact or amend legislation [contrastslight of Canadian jurisprudence. 46
readily with] the flexibility and responsiveness that
The liberty interest enshrined by section 7 of the would characterize a regulatory body.’’ 56 This claim is
Charter is ‘‘engaged where state compulsions or prohibi- based on a misperception of the speed of regulatory
tions affect important and fundamental life choices’’ (i.e., action. More importantly, his rebuttal misses the point: it
it protects individuals’ personal autonomy). 47 However, is all about political will. Parliament acts quickly when it
such ‘‘autonomy is not synonymous with unconstrained wishes to do so. The form of law — legislation versus
freedom’’. 48 To attract section 7 protection, it appears regulation — is not controlling. The amendments to the
that paramount importance would have to be placed on statutes governing remuneration of members of the
an individual’s desire to have a genetically related child. House of Commons and Senate provide an all too per-
But this borders on the absurd: fect example. Bill C-28, as it was called, was introduced
on June 4, 2001, and received Royal Assent only 10 daysIt cannot be just the genetic tie that is important in human
reproduction, because if it were, this could be accomplished later. 57 In sharp contrast, efforts to revamp Canada’s
by having one’s twin brother have a child with one’s wife — blood safety system by the enactment of new regulations
the genetic tie would be identical, yet few, if any, would under the Food and Drugs Act have been underway forargue that this method of reproduction should satisfy the
an extended period. Health Canada expects the newtwin’s right to have a ‘‘genetically-related child.’’ 49 [footnote
omitted] regulations, which are to be based upon ‘‘safety stan-
dards’’ first drafted in 1997 but still under development,There are strong countervailing concerns (e.g., harm to be fully implemented sometime in 2005. 58to the resulting cloned child and breaches of the child’s
section 7 rights), which many argue demand this limit Recent experience in the UK is also significant inon reproductive freedom, if it can even be termed repro- this regard. In response to a judgment issued by the Highduction. 50 Thus a ban on reproductive cloning consti- Court, which excepted embryos created by somatic celltutes a perfectly legitimate constraint on individual lib- nuclear transfer from the purview of the HFE Act, 59 Par-erty and is in accordance with the principles of liament passed the Human Reproductive Cloning Actfundamental justice; that a court in Canada might 2001. 60 The judgment was dated November 15, 2001,decide otherwise appears unimaginable at this stage. 51 and the statute was given Royal Assent on December 4,
The paragraph 2(b) and section 7 Charter argu- 2001. Though the decision was later overturned at the
ments against Bill C-13, specifically the prohibition on Court of Appeal, 61 the UK Parliament did not delay, for
cloning delineated in paragraph 5(1)(a) of the Bill, are fear that someone might create a human clone. By con-
spurious. Indirect support for a non-prohibitive piece of trast, while many commentators have applauded the
legislation is therefore wanting. A latent concern about UK’s model of regulation for its adaptability and (prima-
the flexibility of statutory bans as compared to regula- rily) non-prohibitive approach, it does not follow that
tions seems to underlie Billingsley’s analysis; 52  this struc- such a model is necessarily more streamlined. The HFEA
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was passed on 25 April 2002 and came into force on 1 Julythe Roslin Institute to do therapeutic cloning, one way
2002. 71or the other, for more than a year. 62
Thus in Germany the laws were not impossible to
change per se; rather, the government chose not toStatutory Prohibitions Cannot Keep Pace With
change them in the direction that Wertz et al. appear toScientific Change 
have desired. The debate did take time, but far from
The argument that criminal bans are more cumber- being counterproductive. It is also critical to note that
some than regulations affecting the instant technologies the DFG, the research funding body, was paralysed
is further weakened by observing that the rate of scien- during all this notwithstanding the fact that it did not
tific change is not as rapid as it often appears. There is consider stem cell imports to be illegal. The DFG
supposedly a race amongst the ‘mad scientists’ and received an application to do such research in the
groups like the Raelians to be the first to clone a human summer of 2000, but it withheld approval until the day
being. Assuming that cloning a human was not consid- after Parliament voted in January 2002; the funds were
ered undesirable, current best estimates place safe frozen until the new law came into being seven months
cloning of human beings (i.e., reproductive cloning) a later. 72
hundred years away. 63 If the ‘‘other’’ kind of cloning
Scientific advance is likely to test the scope anddubbed therapeutic cloning, based on the very same
precision of laws. However, it does not follow that regu-scientific technique, takes even one-tenth the time to
latory bodies will feel empowered with sufficientbecome safe, an existing ban could be repealed or modi-
authority to make controversial decisions, absent specificfied 56 times over. 64
guidance from government. This belies any claim that
According to Dorothy Wertz, Marie-Hélène non-prohibitive legislation dependent on the promulga-
Régnier, and Bartha Knoppers, time is not enough. They tion of regulations by a regulatory body can respond to
write, ‘‘[t]oday’s laws become tomorrow’s embarrass- scientific development more swiftly than Parliament. 73
ments when new technologies appear’’, citing Germany,
Sweden, and Denmark as examples of jurisdictions
where destructive embryo research is criminalized. 65
Consequentialist Arguments Wertz et al. assume that because the onset of embryonic
stem cell research has engendered political debate in his category of argument speaks to the potential
those countries over pre-existing laws, and the laws have T consequences of enacting a statute that includes
not been repealed or modified as a result of those statutory prohibitions backed by criminal sanction.
debates, the laws have proven ‘‘impossible to change’’. Critics of Bill C-13 and other proposals claim that nega-
This ignores the possibility that the deliberating tive consequences will ensue if legislation with prohibi-
governments decided that it was not preferable to alter tions is passed. I consider five overlapping arguments in
those laws. 66 Consider the German experience. The this part of the paper.
German Embryo Protection Act, which prohibits the
destruction of embryos for any purpose, came into force Chilling Research in 1991. 67 Following the now-infamous 1998 experi-
It is argued that if prohibitions are proclaimed inments reporting on the therapeutic potential of embry-
force, scientists will not undertake ‘‘valuable’’ research. Itonic stem cells, German researchers found a legal loop-
is also argued that the stigma associated with the com-hole and argued that importing stem cells derived
mission of a crime, or the perception thereof, is bound toabroad does not contravene the law.68 The central public
compromise the research agenda. Scientists, inhibited byfunding organization for academic research in Germany
the threat of criminal sanction, will avoid any activity(the DFG) published a press release affirming this
remotely resembling conduct that is prohibited. 74 Theopinion in March 1999. 69 The Study Commission on
intent of scientists will have to be policed from insideLaw and Ethics in Modern Medicine, and the German
the laboratory walls, adversely impacting the researchNational Ethics Council (GNEC), both created by Parlia-
environment. 75 Still, these are all ‘‘chilling effect’’ argu-ment, issued separate reports on 12 November 2001, and
ments that either lack empirical support or are counter-20 December 2001, respectively. Members in each were
manded by the provisions of Bill C-13, which I illustratedeeply divided, with the majorities reaching opposing
starting with the last:conclusions. 70
Yet the ultimate decision incorporated aspects from
Bans Will Require Excessive Policing of Scientificboth bodies:
Intent On 30 January 2002, the German Parliament voted with a
large majority to uphold embryo protection, emphasizing Bill C-13 establishes an inspection and enforcement
the strict prohibition of any research on embryos that leads regime. Inspectors are given broad powers76 and there
to embryo destruction. It voted for prohibiting, in principle, are some positive duties placed upon the owner-opera-the import of ES cells and, at the same time, decided that a
tors of research facilities to facilitate inspection. 77 How-law should be passed to establish criteria for the exceptional






























































will; they must reasonably believe that a ‘‘controlled diction where it is not banned: ‘‘It will force U.S. scien-
activity is undertaken or that there is any material or tists who have private funding to stop their research, and
information in respect of which this Act applies or any it will accelerate the brain drain to more enlightened
information pertaining to a controlled activity’’. 78 If the countries.’’ 86 Those who are against including statutory
location is a dwelling house, then a warrant must first be prohibitions in Canadian legislation, posit the same.87
obtained, 79 and the inspectors’ expertise80 should allay
researchers’ fears of false criminal allegations for lawful Researchers Will Leave Canada 
activity. Researchers are certainly apt to move around.
When the American President announced that research
Bans Will Cause Lawful Research to be Avoided with stem cell lines derived after 9 August 2001, would
The suggestion that scientists are likely to avoid an be ineligible for federal funding, one leading scientist
activity because it might be seen to remotely resemble moved to the United Kingdom.88 Researchers have also
prohibited conduct is curious, given that expert inspec- been drawn to Israel and Singapore, for their supposedly
tors should be able to keenly distinguish between pro- lax regulatory constraints, the lack of political contro-
hibited and non-prohibited forms of research. Unless the versy, and commercial ventures. 89
prohibitions are vague81 or otherwise imprecise, then But to the extent that researcher movement has
this is unpersuasive. For the purposes of this paper, how- increased of late, the contention that it is motivated by
ever, I have assumed that vagueness is not a problem. anxiety or disdain for criminal prohibitions does not
(Definitional problems will hopefully be remedied prior automatically follow. Jose Cibelli, for example, one of the
to Bill C-13 passing.) Sticking to that assumption then, first researchers to ever undertake somatic cell nuclear
prohibitions may actually encourage researchers. At the transfer experiments with human embryos while
moment, scientists in Canada express hesitation over working for a private company in the U.S., 90 recently
proceeding in a vacuum; unequivocal rules may actually resigned that position, accepting an offer from Michigan
be less chilling than the status quo. 82 State University. In the state of Michigan, all cloning is
criminally banned.91 Furthermore, because of the pau-
Bans Will Force Researchers to Forego Valuable city of viable stem cells, there is an international eager-
Research ness to collaborate, 92 notwithstanding the diversity of
legal approaches to this research.First, it is not known that any of the research activi-
ties prohibited by section 5 of the Bill will prove valu-
able. Proponents of this chilling effect argument are Cutting-Edge Research Will Not Be Performed in
likely to respond that this is why the research must Canada 
proceed. But is this in fact the underlying concern? Are It remains possible that some researchers will leave
critics motivated by a concern about lost therapeutic Canada to pursue research projects that are banned by
value or some other value (e.g., economic value)? And are Bill C-13. Banning select research activities, opponents
such other ends equally worthy of pursuit? Or is a tech- argue, therefore ‘‘assumes that cutting-edge research will
nological imperative — the idea that if something can be be done elsewhere’’. 93
done it will be done, and even should be done —
This proposition, however, presumes that such ‘‘cut-behind the rhetoric of scientific inquiry?
ting-edge’’ research is worthy of pursuit. While scientists
Cutting off an avenue of research, temporarily, frequently take the position that a scientific problem
might actually exert a positive effect. For example, the should be approached with many different methodolo-
research agenda presently appears skewed in favour of gies, they do not necessarily advocate for utilizing every
embryonic stem cells, while studies evidencing greater conceivable technology. For example, Janet Rossant, one
pluripotency in stem cells derived from adult tissues of Canada’s leading stem cell researchers, has expressed
than previously thought continue to appear. 83 hesitation over undertaking chimera research, even
Finally, additional risks attendant upon prohibited though it may be the ‘‘gold standard’’ for testing the
research activities countermand the relative value of pluripotency of stem cells. 94 Reports of an American fer-
those activities to some extent. Cloning to produce stem tility specialist’s work creating ‘‘she-male’’ chimeric
cells, for instance, poses an increased possibility of infi- embryos have been condemned internationally for want
nite cell growth and tumour formation. 84 Moreover, of scientific utility, 95 though the she-male embryos are
scientists are only beginning to identify the effects of nonetheless the products of cutting-edge research.
cloning processes on the resultant organisms; one recent Whether the prohibited NRTs or NGTs, the crea-
survey revealed a previously unrecognized pattern of tion of chimeras included, will prove harmful (in any
defects in cloned animals. 85 sense) remains to be seen. There is evidence and opinion
supporting both promise and peril. If the argument from
Encouraging Forum Shopping critics really is that a particular technology is more bene-
Commentators suggest scientists will leave the juris- ficial on balance, then they should make that argument
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ment’s jurisdiction to enact criminal prohibitions is not Fuelling Public Misperception 
at all dependent on causal evidence of harm.96
Caulfield is the chief proponent of this argument:
[G]overnments should not jump to pass anti-cloning laws,Driving Research Underground 
particularly criminal laws, until they have clear and consis-
Young and Wasunna claim, in relation to the tent justifications for a long-term ban. The use of rigid pro-
prohibitions on commercial surrogacy and ovum dona- hibitive legislation has the potential to do little more than
formally legitimize inaccurate notions of genetic deter-tion, 97 that criminal bans may force activities ‘‘under-
minism. 106ground’’. 98 The Young and Wasunna argument is also
applicable to the section 5 activities: if bans are enacted,
I completely agree with two points that Caulfieldresearchers will nonetheless research the prohibited tech-
makes — that justifications for bans need to be ade-nologies underground, resulting in harmful conse-
quately articulated, and that the public needs to bequences. 99 Young and Wasunna explain, analogizing to
engaged and informed. Yet I fail to see how these claimsabortion:
decidedly favour a non-prohibitive approach.
Prohibitions against abortion merely stopped the practice
by those physicians who did not want to break the law. In Eric Juengst criticizes George Annas’s proposedother words, one might argue that it stopped the ‘‘best’’ of
treaty to ban ‘‘crimes against humanity’’ such as cloningthe abortion practitioners. In driving the practice under-
ground, the legislation masked the existence and stifled the and germ-line genetic alteration, 107 largely because the
outcry that might have resulted if the real horror and costs treaty ignores what Juengst describes as a more pressing
had been known. The big losers were the women, and concern — intolerance for genetic diversity. 108 Thisgenerally less affluent women, who were forced to go under-
approximates Caulfield’s concerns surrounding geneticground and were powerless and vulnerable in the event that
determinism. As Juengst admits, however, the connec-they were mistreated, overcharged or butchered. 100
tion between banning a certain activity and fortifying aThere are analogous demands that could fuel mistaken view is tenuous. For example, it is possible tounderground research of the section 5 activities, which suggest that laws prohibiting human or civil rights viola-might carry similar adverse outcomes. For example, the tions reinforce rather than undermine discriminatoryBill only permits embryos remaining from assisted attitudes. This is an empirical claim, to which there is nohuman reproduction endeavours (i.e., ‘‘spare embryos’’) answer; codifying those prohibitions into law wasto be utilized in research. There is a prohibition on the arguably worth doing in any event. 109creation of embryos solely for research purposes
(i.e.,‘‘research embryos’’). 101 Françoise Baylis has noted Of course the issue of genetic determinism is openthat Canada is probably in short supply of spare to debate. Whereas Caulfield predicts that by usingembryos; 102 therefore, researchers might decide to prohibitions Bill C-13 will exacerbate these mistakensecretly contravene the research embryo creation ban to views, 110 in direct contrast, Lori Andrews and Nanettekeep embryos in supply. Such underground research is Elster invoke genetic determinism as a primary justifica-likely to engender abuses insofar as there are fewer tion for banning cloning. 111 ‘‘Banning cloning would beincentives to obey the requirements of consent and non- in keeping with philosopher Joel Feinberg’s analysis thatcommercialization set out elsewhere in the Bill when the children have a right to an ‘open future’. . . The risk hereactivity is not licensable in the first instance. is of hubris, of abuse of power.’’ 112 This type of philo-
Furthermore, research is already occurring under- sophical engagement with the prohibited activities is
ground in the absence of legislation. Experiments currently absent in the context of Bill C-13, however. 113
breaching existing research guidelines have apparently Thus, speculation one way or the other is not persuasive
become somewhat commonplace in Canada. The Rae- for the issue of inclusion or exclusion of criminal bans.
lians’ efforts to clone a human are well publicized, but
aptly described as ‘‘renegade’’. 103 To suggest that prohibi- Greater articulation of the reasoning behind the
tions on chimera-making and cloning104 would increase prohibitions from Parliament, similar to more mean-
the number of such unsupervised projects lacks any evi- ingful argument about NRTs and NGTs from commen-
dentiary basis. Bill C-13 is importantly unlike the abor- tators, is welcome.114 Other sections of the Bill, including
tion prohibition in that it creates an inspection and the part setting out the ‘‘controlled activities’’, might ben-
enforcement regime that serves to guard against poten- efit from further explanation as well. Intensifying public
tially harmful practices. Accepting that there is no reason misperceptions is therefore not an argument against
to believe that regulatory offences will prove easier to bans so much as a call for a commitment to enabling
enforce than criminal bans, 105 the claim that criminal civic republicanism to counteract misperceptions. That
bans will lead to increased underground research is sus- commitment is what Annas’s proposed treaty fails to
pect at best. Given that underground abuses are inimical pledge. In my view, legislation can combine statutory
to the stated objects of Bill C-13, it is fair to assume prohibitions with an aim to engage citizens. The final
considerable effort will be expended to target research consequentialist argument considers whether criminal






























































ernmental research funding body released two separateClosing Off a Dialogue 
opinions, and two separate committees were struck byLeRoy Walters claims that ‘‘a federal ban at this
Parliament to study and report on the ethical and legaltime would be premature: It would, in effect, announce a
issues, all of which energized debates in the Germanconclusion to a national and international ethical debate
Parliament ultimately culminating in a Parliamentarythat is still ongoing.’’ 115 Similarly, Susan Wolf comments
vote. All this debate and discussion was made necessarythat a ban ‘‘ends the important deliberation, embraces
by the Embryo Protection Act, which prohibits destruc-one absolutist moral perspective, and writes it into
tive embryo research. Perhaps discussion would not havelaw.’’ 116 In the Canadian context, Young and Wasunna
occurred at all or to the same extent without that partic-argue that a ‘‘creatively designed regulatory framework
ular law in place. Certainly, the ban did not quell debate.. . . would have the added benefit of being more acces-
sible and democratic through open and continuing dis-
course with all stakeholders.’’ 117 Similarly, Caulfield dis-
tinguishes: ‘‘The public message of a well-structured A Regulatory Approach Is More Democratic 
regulatory scheme should be that open, vibrant and con- Caulfield spins the argument about the speed oftinued dialogue is encouraged. The message of statutory legislative amendment — ‘‘Parliament is fast enough’’ —bans is that public debate is closed.’’ 118 to move to the issue of democratic accountability, 122 and
This is an important objection, because if the to help make the claim that a non-prohibitive approach
impetus for the legislation is to secure the benefits of is more democratic because it does not send the message
NRTs and NGTs for citizens, while safeguarding them that the debate is over. That is, no matter whether the
from potential harms, Parliament cannot afford to debate is in fact closed, it will be perceived as being
alienate citizens in the process of discovering and delib- closed.
erating about what those benefits and harms are. 119 The
Assessing this objection necessitates an inquiry intoeffect of announcing a conclusion, as Walters puts it, is
the regulatory decision-making mechanisms contem-premised on either the idea that prohibitions are effec-
plated by Bill C-13. Section 21 of the Bill establishes thetively carved in stone or that prohibitions impede con-
Assisted Human Reproduction Agency of Canada (thesensus-seeking or deliberation altogether. The former
‘‘Agency’’). Representation of laypersons on the Agency ispremise, as shown above, is incorrect — finality is not
not statutorily required, and there is no mandatory dutyinherent in a prohibition. With respect to the latter, two
to consult the public. 123 Does this convey a strong mes-closely related claims bear examination: prohibitions
sage of support for open discourse? Moreover, the Billlimit debate, and a non-prohibitive legislative approach
requires that regulations made under the proposed Actis more democratic.
be laid before the House of Commons, except in certain
circumstances, 124 evidencing recognition of the special
Statutory Prohibitions Limit Dialogue significance of democratic accountability in the
There are three counterarguments to this claim, NRT–NGT context. Only Parliamentary debate can
each calling into question whether the existence of statu- claim legitimacy as representative of the views of
tory prohibitions is in fact likely to inhibit discussion. Canadians. No such requirement of Parliamentary scru-
First, entire pieces of legislation or changes to a law in tiny exists in relation to research licences granted by the
force can be proposed at any time by way of private Agency.
members’ Bills. (Many of the Bills proposing bans on
The UK approach is instructive in this regard ascloning — some total and some prohibiting only repro-
well. Lee and Morgan explain:ductive cloning — in the United States Congress have
In keeping with the generally flexible framework of thebeen private members’ Bills. 120) This mechanism exists
legislation, there are enabling provisions under s. 45 for thefor members of the House of Commons to initiate
Secretary of State to make changes by way of regulations.debate in Parliament, and prohibitions provide fertile However, some provisions of the Act are so fundamental to
grounds for such action. the integrity of the scheme agreed on that they may not be
changed without Parliamentary scrutiny . . . Section 45(4)Second, irrespective of whether the private Bill
provides that the Secretary of State may not make regula-mechanism is exercised, the federal government has tions which would permit the hitherto prohibited keeping
promised to revisit the provisions of Bill C-13 and the or use of an embryo (under s. 3(3)(c)) without the opportu-
administration of the statute as a whole within three nity for full Parliamentary consideration secured by the
affirmative resolution procedure. A similar reservation isyears from the date it is proclaimed in force. 121 This
made in respect of any proposal to relax regulations prohib-signals a commitment to ongoing debate and consulta-
iting the storage or use of gametes (s. 4(2)) or any changestion. proposed under sch. 2, para. 1(1)(g) or (4). These last provi-
sions concern, respectively, the practices which may beThird, international experience reveals that bans
authorised in a treatment licence and a condition in ahave fuelled discussion as opposed to exerting a silencing
research licence which authorises the alteration of theeffect. The German example is once more apposite. In genetic structure of an embryo cell. If any amendment is
the wake of the experiments detailing the tremendous proposed to either of these provisions it must be the subject
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cult to monitor, therefore, enforcement will be aThe HFE Act does allow for amendment of prohibi-
problem.131 Furthermore, they claim it is not plain whattions by regulation, but only after debate by elected
the appropriate burden of proof is for these novelrepresentatives. The legislation thus underscores the
crimes. 132importance of democratic accountability when the ‘‘pro-
visions . . . are so fundamental to the integrity of the As to the burden of proof, this issue is by no means
scheme’’. 126 In other words, the means by which amend- unique to these prohibitions. Sexual assault, ostensibly
ment is initiated, by Parliament itself or the regulatory one of the ‘‘ typical ’’ crimes cited by Young and
Wasunna, is a prime example. 133 To the extent that pro-body, is not all-important. However, the forum where
hibited research activities do go underground, theysuch a key decision is made is. And the presence of
become more akin to typical crime. The issue of deci-statutory bans ensures that Parliament is the decision-
phering intent arises because the prohibitions might bemaking forum.
fraught with ambiguity. 134 However, that goes to theDebates among members of the Agency (the Cana- precision of the prohibition as drafted, not to the use ofdian analogue of the HFEA) about which research the prohibition in principle.projects to license and not to license, carry no guarantee
The primary difficulty with this line of argument,of civic participation nor even public knowledge of those
though, is that it offers no support for the corollary claimdebates. If all the activities that are presently prohibited
favouring a non-prohibitive approach. Young andwere instead listed as controlled activities, citizens might
Wasunna argue that the ‘‘subsequent enforcement of lawinterpret a wholly different message than support of
depends on a certain level of commitment to the goals’’open dialogue, one that does not comport with the pith of the legislation. 135 Commitment is necessary to enforceand substance of Bill C-13: prohibitions; equally, commitment is needed to enforce
When a scientific activity has the potential to devalue a regulatory scheme. Even conceding that NRTs and
human life and undermine the principles of human equality NGTs are qualitatively different than all other crimes, itand dignity, that activity deserves to be met with a powerful
does not follow that enforcement of conditions of aand meaningful response . . . Legislation based on a regula-
research licence will be any easier. 136 A non-prohibitivetory framework would not provide such a response . . . The
baseline assumption would be that the activities in question jurisdiction does not escape enforcement issues. 137 In
are acceptable. A regulatory approach therefore fails to cap- terms of infrastructure, the UK’s HFEA employs part-
ture and communicate the importance that should be time inspectors and ‘‘there is clear evidence that inspec-
attached to the values of human life and dignity. 127 tions have been inconsistent from the inception of the
In short, the basis for the claim that legislation, HFEA’’ because many of the inspectors have significant
wholly regulatory in character, is somehow more ame- ties to the field. 138 Thus legislation that is exclusively
nable to continued discourse or is more consistent with regulatory runs the risk of instilling a false sense of public
democracy, is very thin. Moreover, such an approach confidence in the system,139 giving an inaccurate percep-
may dilute the significance of the issues (moral, health, tion that the scheme, as a whole, works.
safety) relating to NRTs and NGTs. The interpretation of
the message conveyed by a non-prohibitive statute
Efficacy crosses over into criminal law theory, which comprises
the third and final category of argument against Bill The efficacy argument is that the prohibitive model
C-13’s inclusion of bans. of regulating NRTs and NGTs will not work. This claim
may arise in two distinct guises: the first recycles the
flawed ‘‘legislation cannot keep pace with the science’’
argument, and the second characterises the criminal lawTheoretical Arguments 
as a model of coercion, of ‘‘command and control’’. 140
he arguments in this section trade on the nature ofT the criminal law, its proper ambit and its limita-
tions. From enforcement to efficacy, two obviously Scientific Change Undermines the Efficacy of the
linked concerns, and then to the claim invoking moral Legislation 
ambiguity, these arguments increasingly depend on the- The political will counterargument still applies, but
oretical cogency. it is useful to recount in greater detail an example
described above that is directly on point. The example
Enforcement reinforces the view that when the science surpasses a
law’s plain wording, the scheme is not rendered defunct.The Bill devotes an entire part to ‘‘Inspection and
Enforcement’’, detailing who can be appointed as inspec- The HFE Act prohibits granting research licences
tors, their tenure, powers, and functions. 128 The Bill pro- that authorize ‘‘replacing a nucleus of a cell of an embryo
vides that inspectors should possess expertise specific to with a nucleus taken from a cell of any person, embryo
the NRT–NGT context. 129 Young and Wasunna never- or subsequent development of an embryo’’. 141 However,
theless take the view that the activities banned are distin- the so-called ‘‘Dolly technique’’ made it possible, in
guishable (in terms of enforcement) from ‘‘more typical theory, to make a human clone without breaching the
violations of the criminal law, such as assault, robbery or statute. In fact, such an experiment is possibly not even































































procedure for cloning appears to fall outside the relevant Thirdly, the sufficiency of this command-control
prohibition because it requires the nucleus to be intro- characterization of the criminal law is subject to chal-
duced into an enucleated ovum, not an embryo. Thus lenge. Certainly, criminal prohibitions aim to shape
the procedure was not, literally speaking, within the behaviour, penalizing breaches of the standards they set
ambit of the statute. Lee and Morgan describe the per- out. Yet the criminal law is not frozen either in terms of
ceived impact of this scientific development: the subject matter to which it can be appropriately
applied or in terms of the various forms by which itThe ‘‘Dolly technique’’ not only stormed the popular imagi-
nation and gave the Boys from Brazil their greatest exercise could be implemented. 153 In theory, there is potential
in the last 15 years, it again appeared to shake the founda- scope for crafting prohibitions backed by criminal penal-
tions on which the 1990 Act had been built; the scientific ties to reflect specifics of the subject matter targeted byrocks on which the legislative house had laid its foundations Bill C-13. The final argument in the paper questionswere being battered by the waves of scientific endeavour
whether an alleged characteristic of NRTs and NGTs —and coming increasingly to resemble the shifting of sands
on which public policy’s slippery slopes have their first moral ambiguity — eliminates any such scope.
outing: law was surfing again the turbulent seas of chaos
theory. 143
Moral Ambiguity 
The Pro-Life Alliance subsequently brought a chal-
The claim here is: ‘‘The public tends to demandlenge to the UK High Court, contending that the HFE
prohibition of conduct that is universally opposed, butAct does not catch the entity created by the Dolly proce-
expects issues of moral ambiguity to be regulated.’’ 154dure. 144 The Court agreed, but the decision was later
Regardless of the authority of this proposition, it is crit-overturned. 145 The UK Parliament intervened in the
ical because it requires exclusion of NRTs and NGTsinterim, however, enacting legislation to extend the
from the proper ambit of the criminal law by definition;scope of the prohibition. 146 The integrity of the scheme
it does not purport to rely on non-existent evidence orwas not surrendered by a dated prohibition. 147
misperceptions about the making of laws. Caulfield
builds on this argument:Coercive Legislation is Counterproductive 
We do not make something a statutory criminal offence
A second version of the efficacy argument identifies simply to ensure oversight by elected officials. There must
be something about the specific act to warrant the applica-the criminal law as a model of ‘‘command and control’’,
tion of the strongest of our regulatory tools . . . To date, theseand as such liable to ‘‘being co-opted by dominant social
clear justifications have been absent. And given the shiftingforces in ways that can often undermine the very initia- nature and moral ambiguity of the topic, I believe clear,tives which led to its creation’’. 148 For example, Bill generally accepted rationales for many of the suggested stat-
C-13’s prohibition of germ-line genetic alteration149 is utory bans will always remain elusive. 155
possibly intended to respond to fears that such interven- The Law Commission of Canada has in the past
tions could cultivate a demand for ‘‘designer babies’’, buttressed this view, stating that only ‘‘conduct which is
which one day could give rise to a state of affairs where culpable, seriously harmful, and generally conceived of as
parents who possess the requisite means actively seek to deserving of punishment’’ is within the proper reach of
enhance their genetic endowment, creating two classes, the criminal law.156 NRTs and NGTs, it seems, lack these
the ‘‘GenRich’’ and ‘‘the naturals’’. 150 Nevertheless, the qualities. Indeed, the literature is replete with disagree-
same evil targeted — genetic determinism — may be ment about the harmfulness of NRTs and NGTs, 157 and
encouraged, it is thought, by criminalizing those classes demonstrable in public opinion as well. 158 Consensus at
of interventions. 151 The same objection might be levied the Parliamentary level (as a reflection of society) is there-
against human rights codes, however, which have so far fore unachievable, so banning certain NRTs and NGTs
failed to eradicate prejudicial and misinformed attitudes. is wrong. 159
But prohibiting discrimination is still laudable. Provided
There are two definitional claims worth pullingat least that legislators and, in turn, regulators endeavour
apart in this line of argument, namely, that the presenceto consult and involve the citizenry, the risk posed by
of moral ambiguity is a bar to the use of statutorydominant social force with respect to NRTs and NGTs
prohibitions, and that the absence of consensus is a barshould be continuously guarded against.
to use of statutory prohibitions.A second tack against this command-control claim
is to ask, ‘‘What is the appropriate measure of efficacy?’’ It
Moral Ambiguity Precludes the Use of Criminalis generally unclear whether the host of behaviours
Bans addressed by the Criminal Code are effectively sup-
pressed or simply managed by the fact of criminalization. The counter to this claim is straightforward: prohib-
Thus the claim that a command-control approach is iting NRTs and NGTs is not problematic in view of the
ineffective in preventing certain activities is not restricted existence of other morally ambiguous offences in the
to the activities listed in the Bill, nor a function of some Criminal Code. Euthanasia is a crime, yet approximately
quality that the NRTs and NGTs share. Similarly, it is 70% of Canadians are in favour of legalizing physician-
difficult to decipher whether a regulatory body is suc- assisted suicide. 160 Criminal libel is another good
ceeding in the execution of its oversight responsibili- example — the harmfulness of this offence has been
ties. 152 Not fitting a command-control description does challenged; however, the Supreme Court of Canada was
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wrongs. 161 Similarly, the supposed immorality of the argue that in spite of this popular disagreement, the
conduct typically ensnared by the obscenity provisions regulatory body would enable NRT–NGT research and
has attracted heavy critique. 162 As Angela Campbell related activities to proceed within reasonable limits.
urges: In this respect it is important to distinguish between
[U]nanimous public views on the wrongfulness of an act is two possible forms of consensus seeking. The query is,not necessarily a requirement for such act [sic] to be validly which form is more optimal? Where consensus isprohibited by Parliament. There are many acts in our
achieved through Parliamentary debate, it is normativesociety that legislators have chosen to criminalize, even
though Canadians as a whole do not agree on their moral in the sense that it is a manifestation of the will of the
blameworthiness. 163 citizenry. On the other hand, consensus achieved
through debate in the Agency’s functioning is pragmaticWhat counts as culpable or morally blameworthy is
in the sense that it directly applies only to a single issuenot contingent on an a priori demonstration of serious
or a single research proposal, and the decision is made byharm. Courts are willing to infer harm and uphold crim-
appointed (as opposed to elected) officials. Normativeinal laws where the federal government is acting on
consensus is probably significantly harder to attain. Itreasonable grounds. 164 The moral ambiguity claim as an
comes down to whether one is comfortable with theabsolute bar to banning NRTs and NGTs is thus unper-
notion of a regulatory body deciding morally conten-suasive.
tious matters while normative consensus fails to be pur-
sued. Is the Agency the preferred ‘‘arbiter of fundamental
Bans are Inappropriate in the Absence of a ethical issues on which there is no widespread agree-
Consensus View ment’’? 170
In the opening of this paper, I suggested that dispute Thus, the moral ambiguity argument is vulnerable
over the employ of criminal bans has thwarted legislative from both angles: Moral ambiguity itself is not a bar to
action. Society perhaps benefits from the delay: the use of prohibitions. Moreover, the onus to demon-
[S]ociety has chosen, for a variety of reasons, to avoid strate that lack of consensus is dire for the enactment of
attempts at reaching a moral consensus. In such a field, then, criminal bans properly lies with those who argue againstgovernment sometimes acts wisely in refusing or failing to
bans on NRTs and NGTs.regulate (by law) in order to allow debate and discussion to
proceed, and perhaps to encourage some moral consensus It is nonetheless important to expressly confrontto emerge. 165 [emphasis added]
this moral ambiguity issue within the framework of the
Alternatively, legislative inaction may inspire Bill, signalling a commitment to initiate consensus
‘‘detachment or disengagement by individuals from seeking. The Royal Commission on New Reproductive
active participation in the political life of their commu- Technologies and Health Canada chose instead to assert
nity,’’ 166 which in turn ‘‘undermines any ability to forge a the existence of consensus. It is time to rethink this
consensus on common public projects, endeavours, or approach. Critics of criminal bans on NRTs and NGTs
goals’’. 167 In other words, by not taking a definitive stand may then succumb to the ‘‘temptation to believe that
on the issues, disagreement persists, with little means for legislative attempts to secure recognition of one partic-
constructive dialogue. As argued in the foregoing, statu- ular view at the expense of others would be the enforce-
tory prohibitions neither pre-empt discussion nor spurn ment of moral majoritarianism.’’ 171
all opportunity for dispute.
That there exists a causal relationship between the
fact of moral ambiguity and an inability to forge a con-
An Argument For More Argument sensus is an assumption deserving of scepticism. Bartha
Knoppers and Sonia Le Bris identified a number of
ndeed, a debate over the proper interaction of law andpoints of general consensus in 1991, 168 constituting nine Imorals, Hart-Devlin revisited again, is not obviouslyof the 10 activities prohibited by section 5 of Bill C-13,
blocked by my starting assumption that laws are neededincluding cloning, parthenogenesis, research on embryos
in this sphere. Whereas in my view neither structural norpast 14 days of development, sex selection, extreme
consequentialist arguments represent a threat to theforms of genetic engineering, inter-species fertilisation,
inclusion of statutory bans in Bill C-13, theoreticaland the creation of chimeras. 169 The onset of stem cell
claims remain viable, possibly invoking the issue of legalresearch and the ‘‘Dolly technique’’ perhaps alters these
moralism. Up to this stage, however, these potentiallypoints of agreement. However, aside from public
opinion polls, has there been any recent effort to gauge more fruitful theoretical claims have mostly been impov-
by how much? Is consensus truly impossible, or is Parlia- erished. 172 Thus, all the arguments advanced against
ment hesitant to test it? criminal bans prove unpersuasive; equally, they fail to
substantiate a non-prohibitive alternative for NRT–NGTMore to the point, is the onus on Parliament to
regulation. Bill C-13 should therefore be proclaimed intodemonstrate consensus? Given that absence of moral
law. Commentators might then meaningfully engageambiguity is non-essential to the definition of a crime,
with criminal law theory. Arguments for and against thethe burden surely rests with those opposed to bans on
prohibited activities should continue to be made inNRTs and NGTs to show that disagreement mandates a































































(both from those that the Bill allows as well as those that Canadians must take part in the discourse. Section 5 of
may not in future be subject to prohibition), and to Bill C-13 would then contain a novel sort of prohibitions
preclude or minimise the measure of harm from those (qualitatively less blunt than commentators to date
technologies. Deliberation should involve a wide constit- envisage) fitting for NRTs and NGTs. This would be a
uency. Criminal bans can be enacted, scientists can chal- much more appropriate result than an effective ban on
lenge them, the Agency can challenge them, but bans.
Notes:
1 Bill C-13, An Act respecting assisted human reproduction and related the Reproductive Revolution (London, U.K.: Blackstone Press Limited,
research, 2nd Sess., 37th Parl., (Reprinted as amended by the Standing London: UK, 2001).
Committee on Health as a working copy for the use of the House of 16 Like Bill C-13, the HFE Act prohibits research on embryos past 14 days of
Commons at Report Stage and as reported to the House on 12 December development, the placing of a human embryo in any nonhuman animal,
2002), online: http://www.parl.gc.ca/PDF/32/2/parlbus/chambus/house/ and a procedure called ‘‘nucleus substitution’’: see ss. 3(3)(a)-(d), 3(4). The
bills/government/C-13_2.pdf (date accessed: 18 April 2003). In the event approach is perhaps more nuance than that taken by Bill C-13 insofar as
that the Bill is not passed when Parliament resumes, the arguments section 3 sets activities, which the HFEA cannot license as opposed to an
analysed in this paper are likely to be re-posited in relation to subsequent outright prohibition. Because the HFEA cannot alter these provisions
legislative proposals. without an act of Parliament, however, the effect is the same. Infra.
2 Contrast Bill C-47, Human Reproductive and Genetic Technologies Act, 17 Dorothy C. Wertz, Marie-Hélène Régnier & Bartha M. Knoppers, ‘‘Stem
2nd Sess., 35th Parl., 1996 (2nd reading 5 November 1996). The Bill died Cells in a Pluralistic Society: Consequences of Proposed Canadian Legis-
on the order paper in April 1997 when the federal government called an lation’’ online: http://www.humgen.umontreal.ca/en/GenEdit.cfm (date
election. Bill C-47 would have simply set out 10 prohibited activities. accessed: 25 March 2003).
Before it died, however, the government produced an opinion paper 18 See LeRoy Walters, ‘‘Research Cloning, Ethics, and Public Policy’’ (2003)detailing a broader regulatory scheme: see Canada, Minister of Health,
299 Science 1661; Wolf, supra note 8; Paul Tully, ‘‘Dollywood is Not JustNew Reproductive and Genetic Technologies: Setting Boundaries,
a Theme Park in Tennessee Anymore: Unwarranted Prohibitory HumanEnhancing Health (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada,
Cloning Legislation and Policy Guidelines for a Regulatory Approach toJune 1996).
Cloning’’ (1998) 31 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1385 at 1412; and, Brendan3 In fact, the popular dispute is reducible to one prohibition in particular: Gogarty & Dianne Nicol, ‘‘The UK’s Cloning Laws: A View from the
the ban on human cloning. Compare, for example, Françoise Baylis & Antipodes’’ (2002) 9:2 Murdoch University Electronic J. of Law, online:
Jocelyn Downie, ‘‘Ban Cloning Do You Copy?’’ The Globe & Mail (3 July http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v9n2/gogarty92nf.htm (date
2002) A13; Françoise Baylis & Jocelyn Downie, ‘‘Cloning for stem cell accessed: 5 February 2003). Notwithstanding the views expressed in the
research is unnecessary and dangerous’’, The Hill Times (3 February 2003) last referenced article, the federal government of Australia, which has
672; and Timothy Caulfield, ‘‘Don’t let Raelians scare Canada into inap- only minimal jurisdiction over the criminal law, passed legislation very
propriate cloning law’’ The Globe & Mail (4 January 2003) A17. similar to Bill C-13 in terms of the activities that are prohibited, albeit
4 Bill C-13, supra note 1, s. 60. with certain limitations: see Prohibition of Human Cloning Act 2002
(Cth.), No. 144, 2002, online: http://scaleplus.law.gov.au.html/comact/5 Ibid., s. 61.
browse/TOCN.htm (date accessed: 15 March 2003).6 Except to the extent that an argument depends on other provisions of the 19 R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295.Bill. In which case, those provisions are clearly relevant to issues sur-
rounding section 5. 20 Lee and Morgan’s description of the purpose of the HFE Act is to the
same effect, supra note 15 at 12: ‘‘The challenge is to obtain all the7 One commentator raised this issue in relation to a past initiative: see
benefits and advantages of these developments in reproductive tech-Patrick Healy, ‘‘Statutory Prohibitions and the Regulation of New Repro-
nology, but to control these developments and guide them in the direc-ductive Technologies under Federal Law in Canada’’ (1995) 40 McGill L.J.
tions that we want.’’905 at 924ff.
21 Of course, it is arguable that the legislation is colourable; however, RJR-8 Some have made this argument though; see, for example, Judith F. Daar,
MacDonald v. Canada, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199, casts substantial doubt on this.‘‘Regulating Reproductive Technologies: Panacea or Paper Tiger?’’ (1997)
In that case, the Supreme Court held that criminalizing certain forms of34 Hous. L. Rev. 609 at 657. Contrast, Susan M. Wolf, ‘‘Ban Cloning? Why
advertising did not amount to a colourable use of the criminal law eitherNBAC Is Wrong’’ (1997) 27:5 Hastings Center Report 12.
because the advertising was ancillary to the evil (i.e., not evil itself) or that9 However, as I will eventually point out in part four of this paper, this it was ineffective at addressing the public health issue at hand.
question is still important on a theoretical level: legislating in this area 22 Canada, Proceed with Care: Final Report of the Royal Commission onbrings into play fundamental questions about the role of the state as a
New Reproductive Technologies, vol. 1 (Ottawa: Minister of Govern-liberal state as opposed to a communitarian state, or somewhere in the
ment Services of Canada, 1993) at 18.lacuna between the two.
23 See Martha Jackman, ‘‘The Constitution and the Regulation of New10 See for example, U.N.A. v. Alberta (Attorney General) (1992), 13 C.R. (4th)
Reproductive Technologies,’’ in Royal Commission on New Reproduc-1 (S.C.C.). Whether this standard is met in reality is questionable; yet I do
tive Technologies, Overview of Legal Issues in New Reproductive Tech-not agree that definitional problems are insoluble: see Jason S. Robert,
nologies (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1993) at 16.‘‘Regulating the Creation of Novel Beings’’ (2002) 11:1 Health L. Rev. 9;
Matthew Herder, ‘‘Donate a Definition’’ (2002) 11:1 Health L. Rev. 40. 24 Existing jurisprudence tips the balance heavily in favour of provincial
authority over health on the basis of subsection 92(16), matters of a11 Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985,
‘‘merely local or private nature’’, and subsection 92(13), property and civilApp. II, No. 5.
rights: see per Dickson J. in Schneider, v. The Queen, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 11212 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, at 136-7. Nevertheless, health is such ‘‘an amorphous topic [it] can be
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. addressed by valid federal or provincial legislation, depending in the
13 Timothy Caulfield, ‘‘Clones, Controversy, and Criminal Law: A Com- circumstances of each case on the nature or scope of the health problem
ment on the Proposal for Legislation Governing Assisted Human Repro- in question’’: per Estey J. in Schneider, ibid., at 142. For a summary see
duction’’ (2001) 39:2 Alta. L. Rev. 335 at 344. Jennifer J. Llewellyn, Jocelyn Downie & Robert Holmes, ‘‘Protecting
Human Research Subjects: A Jurisdictional Analysis ’’, forthcoming,14 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (U.K.), 1990, c. 37. The statute
Health L. J [forthcoming].was amended by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research
Purposes) Regulations 2001, S.I. 2001/188. 25 Ibid. I do not deal further with Jackman’s argument because Llewellyn et
al. are persuasive.15 In this vein, extensive use will be made of one text in particular: Robert
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27 Whether NRTs (and NGTs) possess the requisite ‘‘singleness, distinctive- 52 Billingsley, supra note 38 at 36, writes: ‘‘The extent to which these
ness and indivisibility’’, for instance, is open to dispute: see Llewellyn et general objectives can be achieved by the Ban is unknown but the Ban’s
al., supra note 24. denial of freedom of expression is total’’.
28 Health Canada, ‘‘Assisted Human Reproduction: Frequently Asked Ques- 53 Canadian Bar Association, ‘‘Submission on Draft Legislation on Assisted
tions’’ (May 2001), online: Health Canada http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/english/ Human Reproduction’’ (2002) 10:2 Health L. Rev. 25 at para. 8.
archives/releases/2001/2001_44ebk3.htm (date accessed: 15 January 54 Baylis & Downie, supra note 3.2003) at question 2.
55 Bill C-13, supra note 1, has since been modified such that regulations29 Reference re Validity of Section 5(a) of the Dairy Industry Act, [1949] may not be made ‘‘before the earliest of 30 sitting days after the proposedS.C.R. 1 at 50. An argument that Parliament cannot legitimately endorse regulation is laid before Parliament’’ or ‘‘160 calendar days after theone conception of morality, as embodied by the statutory prohibitions, proposed regulation is laid before Parliament’’ or ‘‘the day after theseems destined to fail: see for example, R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 at appropriate committee of each House of Parliament has reported itspara. 80. findings with respect to the proposed regulation’’: subsection 66(3). Regu-
30 Llewellyn et al., supra note 24. lations can be made in lesser time if ‘‘the changes made by the regulation
to an existing regulation are so immaterial or insubstantial that sec-31 It is unnecessary to consider the other sources of federal jurisdiction;
tion 66 should not apply in the circumstances’’, or if ‘‘the regulation musthowever, for a more detailed inquiry see Llewellyn et al., supra note 24.
be made immediately in order to protect the health or safety of anyThe authors conclude that there is strong support for federal jurisdiction
person’’: paragraphs 67(1)(a), and (b), respectively.over research involving humans; however, their account is also persuasive
in relation to NRTs and NGTs. 56 Tim Caulfield, ‘‘Bill C-13 The Assisted Human Reproduction Act: Exam-
ining the Arguments Against a Regulatory Approach’’ (2002) 11:1 Health32 Jackman, supra note 23 at 11; Allison Harvison Young & Angela
L. Rev. 20 at 21. At least he does not go so far as to suggest that a banWasunna, ‘‘Wrestling with the Limits of Law: Regulating New Repro-
would foreclose an avenue of research in perpetuity: see Shannon H.ductive Technologies’’ (1998) 6 Health L.J. 239 at para. 70.
Smith, ‘‘Ignorance Is Not Bliss: Why a Ban on Human Cloning is Unac-33 Especially as contrasted with Bill C-47, supra note 2. ceptable’’ (1999) 9 Health Matrix 311 at 333-334.
34 See RJR-MacDonald, supra note 21, and Re Firearms Act, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 57 An Act to Amend the Parliament of Canada Act, the members of Parlia-
783 summarised in Llewellyn et al., supra, note 24. ment Retiring Allowances Act and the Salaries Act, Canada Legislative
Index, 1st Sess., 37th Parliament, Bill C-28 S.C. 2001, c. 20.35 Assuming that is the source of the enacting government’s jurisdiction: see
Re Firearms Act, ibid., at para. 37; see also Llewellyn et al., supra note 24. 58 See Health Canada, ‘‘Towards a Renewed Regulatory Framework for the
Safety of Blood and Blood Components intended for Transfusion’’36 For a summary of potential remedies for violation of the Constitution, see
(2 November 2001), online: http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hpfb-dgpsa/bgtd-Schachter v. Canada, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679.
dpbtg/03_reg_framework_blood_e.pdf (date accessed: 6 August 2003);37 Both forms are based on the same scientific procedure called somatic cell and Health Canada, ‘‘Safety Standards for Blood and Blood Compo-
nuclear transfer, also referred to as cell nuclear replacement, or even the nents’’ (2 November 2001), online: http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hpfb-dgpsa/
‘‘Dolly technique’’. This author’s focus is on so-called therapeutic cloning bgtd-dpbtg/04_blood_stds_e.pdf (date accessed: 6 August 2003). True, the
only, however, where the goal is to develop cloned cells and organs as remarkable speed with which the remuneration laws were revised is
opposed to full human beings (or so-called reproductive cloning). tempered by the relative simplicity of these amendments. However, the
38 Barbara Billingsley, ‘‘A Constitutional Analysis of the Proposed Ban on regulations in respect of NRTs and NGTs are more likely to approach
Non-Reproductive Human Cloning: An Unjustified Violation of the new blood safety regulations in terms of the complexity and techni-
Freedom of Expression?’’ (2002) 11:1 Health L. Rev. 32. For present cality of the subject matter.
purposes, I will concentrate on the arguments she puts forth to support 59 Quintavalle v. Secretary of State for Health, [2001] 4 All E.R. 1013.the view that paragraph 2(b) of the Charter would in fact be violated, and
60 Human Reproductive Cloning Act 2001 (U.K.), 2001, c. 23. See thenot saved under section 1 of the Charter, if the prohibition on thera-
explanatory notes accompanying the statute, online: http://www.uk-legis-peutic cloning were enacted, and subsequently challenged. Interestingly,
lation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/en/2001en23.htm (date accessed: 2 Decembera number of commentators in the United States have argued that the
2002).criminalization of therapeutic cloning by Congress would amount to a
violation of the freedom of scientific inquiry under the First Amendment 61 The Court of Appeal decision was recently affirmed by the House of
of the U.S. Constitution: see Wolf, supra note 8 at 13; and, Tully, supra Lords: Quintavalle v. Secretary of State for Health, [2003] H.L.J. No. 13,
note 18 at 1412; and, Walters, supra note 18. Apparently, ‘‘freedom of aff’g [2002] E.W.C.A. Civ. 29.
research is endorsed in the German constitution’’ as well: see Eve-Marie
62 Personal communication with Sarah Franklin, Professor of AnthropologyEngels, ‘‘Human embryonic stem cells — the German debate’’ (2002) 3
of Science, Sociology Department, Lancaster University; this is confirmedNature Reviews Genetics 636 at 639.
on the HFEA Web site, online: http://www.hfea.gov.uk/for Media/39 Billingsley, ibid., at 38. archived/13032003.htm (date accessed: 18 April 2003).
40 Irwin Toy v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927. 63 Cynthia B. Cohen, ‘‘Banning Human Cloning — Then What?’’ (2001)
41 Billingsley, supra note 38 at 33. 11:2 Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 205 at 208.
42 Ibid. 64 This figure is based on the projected number of sitting days for the
House of Commons in 2003, which totals 135, using that figure as an43 Ibid., at 34.
average (135/24 = 5.6  10 = 56). See the House of Commons Calendar,44 Ibid. available online http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/about process/house/
calendar/PDF/2003-e.pdf (date accessed: 18/04/03).45 Young & Wasunna, supra note 32 at para. 51, appear to raise the security
of the person argument in relation to the prohibition on commercial 65 Supra note 17 at 3.
surrogacy; since that prohibition is not amongst those listed in section 5, I 66 Wertz et al.’s comment also implies that such a decision, in light of thewill not attempt to deal with it.
scientific developments, was misinformed or wrong, as opposed to a46 George J. Annas, Lori B. Andrews & Rosario M. Isasi, ‘‘Protecting the product of a different cultural context. This seems at odds with the
Endangered Human: Toward an International Treaty Prohibiting authors’ supposed rhetorical commitment to ‘‘pluralistic society’’: supra
Cloning and Inheritable Alterations’’ (2002) 28 Am. J. L.aw & Med 151 at note 17 at 2.
160. 67 Engels, supra note 38 at 637.47 Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), [2000] 2 68 Ibid., at 638.S.C.R. 307 at para. 49.
69 Ibid., at 636.48 Ibid., at para. 54.
70 GNEC members voted for a three-year limited import of embryonic49 Annas et al., supra note 46 at 160.
stem cells over a moratorium on the practice, by a 15–10 majority. In50 Ibid., at 159. contrast, the majority of the Commission wanted to preclude importa-
51 See also Cameron v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General), [1999] N.S.J. No. tion, while the minority thought it desirable only under strict conditions,































































71 Ibid., at 641. tion of human chimera research’’ Canadian Press (3 July 2003), available
o n l i n e :  h t t p : / / w w w . c a n a d a . c o m / s e a r c h / s t o r y . a s p x ? i d =72 Ibid.
aea0ca20-8d29-47ac-9b71-17fd1b81641e (date accessed: 13 July 2003).73 It is worth reiterating the HFEA example here: the Roslin Institute has 96 See Butler, supra note 29 at para. 112. In that case, the absence of stronghad an application to do therapeutic cloning research under considera-
social science evidence to show the harms of pornography was not at alltion by the HFEA for over a year. This significantly undermines the view
persuasive.that the absence of criminal bans enables quicker regulatory action.
97 Bill C-13, supra note 1, ss. 6, 7.74 Nati Somekh, ‘‘The European Total Ban on Human Cloning: An Analysis
of the Council of Europe’s Actions in Prohibiting Human Cloning’’ 98 Young & Wasunna, supra note 32.
(1999) 17 B.U. Int’l L.J. 397 at 422. 99 Indeed, Wertz et al., supra note 17 at 3, allude to this argument as well in75 Wolf, supra note 8 at 13. tandem with the preceding forum shopping claim: ‘‘Bans would drive
research to other countries, underground, or the private sector (including76 Bill C-13, supra note 1, ss. 47, 50.
offshore). ’’77 Ibid., s. 47(4).
100 Young & Wasunna, Supra note 32 at para. 45.78 Ibid., s. 47(1).
101 Bill C-13, supra note 1, paragraph 5(1)(b).79 Ibid., s. 48.
102 Françoise Baylis, ‘‘Human Embryonic Stem Cell Lines: The Ethics of80 Pursuant to subsection 46(1) the regulatory body can set qualifications for
Derivation’’ (2002) 24:2 J. Obstetrics Gynaecology Canada 159.inspectors in regulations. Moreover, it is unlikely that inspectors will be
ordinary peace officers: subsection 48(3) explicitly requires such an officer 103 Cohen, supra note 634 at 208. Tully, supra note 18 at 1388 posits that ‘‘a
to accompany an inspector if force is to be used. I deal with issues of moratorium enacted on human cloning in the United States could lead
enforcement in part three below. to desperate people in want of a child resorting to underground, private
cloning services.’’81 Wolf, supra note 8 at 13, argues that vagueness compounds the chilling
effect. 104 Bill C-13, supra note 1, paragraphs 5(1)(i), and 5(1)(a), respectively.
82 In fact, only very recently have Canadian scientists vowed to go forward 105 See part four below.
with embryonic stem research in the absence of legislative guidance, 106 Tim Caulfield, ‘‘Cloning and genetic determinism — a call for consis-notwithstanding the existence of funding guidelines, which are largely
tency’’ (2001) 19 Nature Biotechnology 403. He undercuts some ofconsistent with the proposed Bill C-13: see Norma Greenaway, ‘‘Scien-
arguments against reproductive cloning premised on individuality andtists won’t wait for stem cell law: Researchers prepare to use embryos
autonomy in his article. It is somewhat curious that he does not high-while MPs dither’’ The Ottawa Citizen (16 June 2003) A1.
light these points of moral ambiguity in the context of arguing against83 J.G. Toma et al., ‘‘Isolation of multipotent adult stem cells from the banning therapeutic cloning.
dermis of mammalian skin’’ (2001) 3 Nature Cell Biology 778; Y. Jiang et 107 These technologies are also banned in Bill C-13, supra note 1,al., ‘‘Pluripotency of mesenchymal stem cells derived from adult marrow’’
paragraphs 5(1)(a) and (f).(2002) 418 Nature 41; also, stem cells derived from bone marrow have
been shown to initiate tissue regeneration: D. Hess et al., ‘‘Bone marrow- 108 ‘‘ ‘Alter-ing’ the Species: Misplaced Essentialism in International Science
derived stem cells initiate pancreatic regeneration’’ (2003) 21 Nature Policy’’, presented at a workshop, ‘‘Interspecific Chimaeras — Scientific
Biotechnology 763. Necessity, Moral Abomination, Neither, or Both?’’ April 10-12, 2003,
Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia.84 Robert Winston, ‘‘Embryonic Stem Cell Research — The Case For. . . ’’
(2001) 7 Nature Medicine 396. 109 Personal communication with Eric Juengst, Associate Professor of
Biomedical Ethics, Case Western Reserve University School of85 Susan M. Rhind, et al., ‘‘Cloned lambs — lessons from pathology’’ (2003)
Medicine, Cleveland, Ohio.21 Nature Biotechnology 744.
110 Supra note 106.86 Janet D. Rowley, et al., ‘‘Harmful Moratorium on Stem Cell Research’’
(2002) 297 Science 1957. 111 Lori B. Andrews & Nanette Elster, ‘‘Regulating Reproductive Technolo-
gies’’ (2000) 21 J Legal. Med. 35, at 61-63.87 E.g., Wertz et al., supra note 17.
88 The scientist is Dr. Roger Pederson; see ABC News.com, ‘‘Left Behind?’’, 112 Ibid., at 63, citing Joel Feinberg, ‘‘The Child’s Right to an Open Future’’,
on l ine :  h t tp : / / abcnews . go . com/sec t ions /wnt /Da i l yNews/ in William Aiken & Hugh LaFollete eds., Whose Child? Children’s
wnt_stemcells010811.html (date accessed: 12 March 2003). Rights, Parental Authority, and State Power (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and
Littlefield, 1980).89 Gretchen Vogel, ‘‘In the Mideast, Pushing Back The Stem Cell Frontier’’
(2002) 295 Science 1818; Dennis Normile, ‘‘Can Money Turn Singapore 113 Under the heading ‘‘An Argument For More Argument’’, I put forward a
Into a Biotech Juggernaut?’’ (2002) 297 Science 1470. call to action along these lines.
90 Jose Cibelli et al., ‘‘Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer in Humans: Pronuclear 114 See generally, Angela Campbell, ‘‘Defining A Policy Rationale For the
and Early Embryonic Development’’ (2001) 2 J. Regen. Med. 25. Criminal Regulation of Reproductive Technology’’ (2002) 11:1 Health
L. Rev. 26. It seems Caulfield holds the view that no satisfactory rationale91 Mich. Comp. L. §  333.26401–333.26406, §  333.16274–333.16275, §
for the prohibitions can be articulated because bans, in his opinion,333.20197, §  750.430a (1999).
cannot be utilized where there is moral ambiguity. I deal with this line92 ‘‘At a 7 January meeting in London organized by the U.K. Medical of argument below in part three of the paper.
Research Council (MRC), heads of research agencies in eight countries — 115 Supra note 18.Australia, Canada, Finland, Israel, Singapore, Sweden, the United
Kingdom, and the United States — hashed out ways to boost the pace of 116 Supra note 8 at 13.
human ES cell research’’: see Gretchen Vogel & Constance Holden, ‘‘Key 117 Supra note 32 at para. 6.Questions Loom Over Effort to Energize Research’’ (2003) 299 Science
493. The same group met for a second time on 30 May 2003: Pat Hagan, 118 Supra note 56 at 23.
‘‘Stem cell collaboration: International stem cell researchers discuss ways 119 For instance, there is a growing literature about whether reproductiveto cooperate rather than compete’’ The Scientist (2 June 2003), available cloning is actually beneficial or harmful. Yet no one in Canada is ques-online: http://www.biomedcentral.com/news/20030602/02/ (date tioning this effect of the cloning prohibition.accessed: 27 July 2003).
120 For a summary of many of those Bills, see George J. Annas, ‘‘Cloning and93 Wertz et al., supra note 17 at 2. The authors also comment ‘‘[p]rohibitive
the U.S. Congress’’ (2002) 346:20 N. Engl. J. Med. 1599.approaches tend to contribute to . . . the exodus of researchers . . .
[causing] research to migrate to countries where there is little ethical 121 Bill C-13, Ssupra note 1, s. 70.
oversight.’’ I would state in response that if the researchers want to do 122 Caufield, ‘‘Bill C-13’’, supra note 56 at 21.research in such conditions, then let them go.
123 Bill C-13, supra note 1, section 26, paragraph 24(1)(f), respectively.94  Vogel & Holden, supra note 92 at 495.
124 Ibid., ss. 66, 67.95 Ian Sample, ‘‘Scientists hit out at creator of ‘she-males’’’ The Guardian (3
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126 If opponents of statutory bans contend that specific prohibited activities tory offence; moreover, administrative agencies such as the Agency
are not fundamental, then that argument should be explicit. established by Bill C-13, ‘‘cannot enact retroactively unless the statute so
provides, either implicitly or explicitly’’: ibid., at 146. Thus, the issue of127 Campbell, supra note 114 at 29. Campbell is identifying the ‘‘symbolic
retroactivity does not favour one approach (prohibitive or non-prohibi-weight’’ of prohibitions as opposed to regulatory decisions. Caulfield
tive) over the other.responds by placing the onus on the government to justify that these
‘‘concerns are of such weight as to warrant this type of ‘signal’’’: supra 148 Young & Wasunna, supra note 32 at para. 34-35. The authors are using
note 56 at 23. In my view, this is again an argument only for greater the argument in relation to the prohibition on commercial surrogacy.
articulation, not against the use of bans in principle. Additionally, this 149 Supra note 1, paragraph 5(1)(f).underscores the need for articulation of the very problem of moral
150  Lee M. Silver, ‘‘Remaking Eden: Cloning and Beyond in a Brave Newambiguity in the sphere of NRTs and NGTs. Healy probably would not
World ’’ (New York: Avon Books, 1997) at 4.agree in that he goes further than Caulfield, arguing that ‘‘[i]t is undesir-
able to use the force of the criminal law to make strictly symbolic 151 Caulfield, supra note 106.
declarations of fundamental values’’: supra note 7 at 941. In response I 152 Lee & Morgan, supra note 15, at 142, concede that it ‘‘is hard to know inwould simply ask, why?
any case how one might judge the HFEA to be effective’’.128 Supra note 1, ss. 45-59.
153 RJR-MacDonald, supra note 21; the Law Commission of Canada has129 Young & Wasunna, supra note 32 at para. 20-21, agree that this defeats recently issued a discussion paper, which is noteworthy: ‘‘What is aexpertise concerns. Healy, supra note 7 at 933, raised the problem of Crime?: Challenges and Alternatives’’, online: http://www.lcc.gc.ca/en/ordinary police officers being asked to enforce. themes/crime/discussion_paper/chap02.asp (date accessed: 21 April
130 Young & Wasunna, Ibid. 2003).
131 Wolf, supra note 8 at 13. 154 Gogarty & Nicol, supra note 18 at para. 32, citing from D. Stone, Where
the Law Ends. The Social Control of Corporate Behaviour (Harper and132 Healy, supra note 7 at 933.
Row: New York,: Harper and Row, 1975) at 97. Caulfield has repeated133 For a discussion of the controversy surrounding the mens rea for this this proposition on several occasions: supra note 3 at A17 and supra noteoffence, see Brian Rolfes, ‘‘The Golden Thread of Criminal Law — 56 at 22.Moral Culpability and Sexual Assault’’ (1998) 61 Sask. L. Rev. 87.
155 Caulfield, supra note 56 at 23.134 Wolf, supra note 8 at 13, identifies this concern.
156 Canada, The Criminal Law in Canadian Society (Ottawa: Government135 Young & Wasunna, supra note 32 at para. 20-21. On a related point, the
of Canada, 1982).authors at para. 33 also argue that ‘‘[t]he fact that the consensus under-
lying Bill C-47 is so thin is cause for concern because it relates directly to 157 Most notably with respect to cloning, by which I mean reproductive as
the enforceability of the legislation.’’ I deal more with the issue of well as therapeutic cloning. For a short back and forth, see ‘‘At Issue;
consensus under ‘‘Moral Ambiguity’’, infra; however, it is worth men- Human Cloning Should the United States legislate against it?’’: George J.
tioning that inspectors can be screened for their apparent allegiance to Annas, ‘‘Yes: Individual dignity demands nothing less’’ and John A.
enforcing the statute’s provisions. Presumably, only those fully com- Robertson, ‘‘No: The potential for good is too compelling’’ 83 A.B.A.J. 80.
mitted to enforcing the statute would be selected. 158 Caulfield, supra note 56 at 21; however, little weight should be given to
136 Of course, the penalties are less for breach of licence condition (max- such polls because scientific studies provide support for the view that
imum penalties are half that attached to prohibited activities). However, ‘‘an informed and rational citizen does not exist, at least not in the
in view of sentencing principles described above, this discrepancy is political realm’’: Deetram A. Scheufele, ‘‘Deliberation or dispute? An
likely to be attenuated. explanatory study examining dimensions of public opinion expression’’
(1999) 11:1 International J Public Opinion Research 25.137 For example, after the UK’s HFEA refused to permit a married couple to
have a child with the same immune system genetic makeup as the 159 Additional support for this claim is found in Young & Wasunna, supra
couple’s four year-old son who suffers from a rare genetic disorder, the note 32 at para. 30, and Canadian Bar Association, supra note 53 at
couple travelled to the US to conceive the ‘‘designer baby’’ and then para. 8.
returned home, where the baby was born: see Shaoni Bhattacharya, 160 ‘‘70% of Canadians favour doctor-assisted suicide’’ The Vancouver Sun‘‘Banned ‘designer baby’ is born in UK’’ New Scientist (19 June 2003),
(16 December 1997) A1, A2; see also CTV/National Angus Reid Poll,available online: http://www.newscientist.com/news/news.jrp?id=
‘‘Canadians’ Views on Euthanasia’’ (6 November 1997), available online,ns99993854 (date accessed: 21 June 2003).
http://www.ipsos-reid.com/search/pdf/media/pr971106.pdf (date138 Lee & Morgan, supra note 15 at 14. accessed: 28 July 2003).
139 Robert Winston makes several remarks to this effect, cited in Lee & 161 R. v. Lucas, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 439 at para. 76.
Morgan, supra note 15 at 13-14. 162 Butler, supra note 29; see Jennifer Nedelsky, ‘‘Reconceiving Rights as140 Young & Wasunna, supra note 32. It is also worth highlighting that the Responsibility’’ (1993) 1 Rev. Const.itutional Studies 1.
HFEA has been characterized as having the capacity to operate by way 163 Supra note 114 at 26.of command and control, though that has not been the practice. Rather,
‘‘[t]he picture that emerges is one of a continual dialogue between the 164 E.g., Butler, supra note 29; see also R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697.
regulator and the regulated’’: Lee & Morgan, supra note 15, at 142. I 165 Lee & Morgan, supra note 15 at 267.might add that this should not be surprising given that many of the
inspectors are also researchers in the field. Moreover, there is no reason 166 Charles Taylor, The Malaise of Modernity (Toronto: Anansi, 1991), as
why dialogue between researchers and regulators cannot occur when explained in Michael Trebilcock, ‘‘Testing the Limits of Freedom of
prohibitions are in force. Contract: The Commercialization of Reproductive Materials and Ser-
vices’’ (1994) 32 Osgoode Hall L.J. 613 at para. 60.141 HFE Act, supra note 14, paragraph 3(3)(d), [emphasis added].
167 Trebilcock, ibid., at para. 61.142 This argument, though ultimately unsuccessful, was made in
Quintavalle v. Secretary of State for Health, supra notes 59 and 61. 168 Bartha M. Knoppers & Sona Le Bris, ‘‘Recent Advances in Medically
Assisted Conception: Legal, Ethical and Social Issues’’ (1991) 17 Am. J. L.143 Supra note 15 at 91.
& Med. 329.144 Supra note 59 and accompanying text.
169 These appear to correspond to paragraphs 5(1)(a), (c), (d), (e), (f ), (j ), (g),145 Supra note 61 and accompanying text. (h), and (i). Only the prohibition on the creation of embryos solely for
146 Human Reproductive Cloning Act 2001, supra note 60. research was not identified by the authors: paragraph 5(1)(b).
147 In Canada, it remains possible that research conducted prior to legisla- 170 Lee & Morgan, supra note 15 at 8-9.
tive amendment would escape penalty because of the rule against the 171 Lee & Morgan, supra note 15 at 270.retroactive operation of statutes, especially where the statute codifies
criminal offences: see Pierre André Côté, The Interpretation of Legisla- 172 For example, not once did I come across anyone citing Joel Feiberg’s
tion in Canada, 3rd ed. (Scarborough: Carswell, 2000) at 147. Arguably, seminal work: The moral limits of the criminal law (New York : Oxford
the same rule against retroactivity would apply in the case of a regula- University Press, 1984).
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